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The Negotiations Process 
and Structures
FROM PROTESTS TO STRIKES
This chapter examines the process by which unions and employers negotiate 
collective agreements and the structures they use for those negotiations, con­
tinuing the analysis of the middle (functional) level of labor relations activity. 
It explains the dynamics of negotiations and the factors that lead to strikes 
and then goes on to discuss the different bargaining structures used in 
negotiations.
Labor conflict in emerging countries often takes on the form of spontane­
ous outbreaks and protests against government policies that cut workers’ 
wages or benefits or against rising prices or violations of labor rights. This was 
the case in China during much of the first decade of this century as a growing 
number of workers reacted in frustration to the harsh conditions of migrant 
labor, which involved working away from their homes and families, living in 
large and sometimes cramped dormitories, working long hours, and being 
denied access to the social benefits and legal protections that other local citi­
zens received. Foxconn, the large manufacturing firm, was the most visible 
protest site. Pressures for better approaches to workplace conflicts went global 
when it became known that as many as seventeen Foxconn workers commit­
ted suicide in protest of the company’s harsh working and living conditions. 
In Greece, when the European Commission and other international financial 
agencies mandated economic reforms and cutbacks in pensions and other 
benefits as conditions for the funds they had provided so the country could 
avoid national bankruptcy, coalitions of unions and NGOs called a series of 
short strikes.
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Often a pivotal and highly visible strike leads others in a country to engage 
in similar workplace actions, and then pressures and support build for the de­
velopment of a more complete labor relations system and negotiations pro­
cess. The 2010 strike at Honda’s manufacturing facility had this effect in 
China (see box 6.1). Strikes by black trade unionists in South Africa played an 
even more significant political role. By bringing attention to the injustices of 
apartheid, they helped usher in a transformation to a more representative and 
democratic government. Strikes in the early 1930s in the United States simi­
larly were a driving force that led to the passage of legislation that established 
collective bargaining as the cornerstone of labor policy in the United States. 
Today, history is repeating itself in the United States, albeit on a more modest 
scale, as periodic labor protests or one-day strikes by groups of Walmart 
workers and workers at various fast food chains seek to establish ongoing rep­
resentation and negotiations with these giant retail chains.
BOX 6.1
2010 Honda Strike in China
Workers demanding higher wages rallied outside a Honda plant in 
southern China today, part of a rash of industrial action at Chinese fac­
tories highlighting growing restiveness among migrant workers.
Several hundred workers gathered at the front gates of parts supplier 
Honda Lock in Zhongshan, Guangdong, where staff walked off the job 
yesterday.
Today’s rally came as Honda was resuming production at two other 
car assembly plants after resolving a three-day strike at parts supplier 
Foshan Fengfu Autoparts.
Honda said the factory employees agreed to a pay raise of 366 yuan 
'(£36) per month for each full-time worker. That would increase pay 
for a new employee to 1,910 yuan (£190) per month.
Some workers held out for more and the union said about 30 people 
fought with union officials on Monday.
Geoffrey Crothall, spokesman for the Hong Kong-based China La­
bour Bulletin, said “workers had largely been willing to bide their time 
and accept their salaries during the recent economic slowdown. But 
since the economy began to improve again last year, longer hours with 
no appreciable improvement in income have prompted some to take 
action.”
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“They see strikes have been successful elsewhere and decide to try 
their luck,” he said.
Crothall said the strikes also revealed deep disdain for official union 
representatives, who are appointed by management and the Commu­
nist party rather than elected by the workers themselves.
However, he questioned media reports saying the Honda Lock 
workers wanted to form their own independent union, saying it was 
more likely a desire simply to elect their own leaders who represented 
their own, and not management’s, interests.
In an unusually open commentary yesterday, the People’s Daily, the 
official paper of the Communist party, exhorted the government-affili­
ated labour umbrella, the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, to do 
a better job as a mediator.
“Labour relations are increasingly complex and important today, but 
unions lack the talent needed to gain workers’ trust and do their jobs 
well,” it said.
“There is no shortage of enthusiastic, diligent cadres but there is a 
lack of professional personnel qualified to deal with new challenges and 
tasks.”
Source: Reprinted from “Honda Factory Workers in China Strike over Pay and 
Conditions,” The Guardian, June 11, 2010, http://www.theguardian.com/ 
business/2010/jun/11/honda-workers-strike-china-pay.
THE ROLES OF STRIKES AND NEGOTIATIONS 
IN Ä l ABOK RELATIONS SYSTEM
In contrast to the spontaneous strikes such as the one at the Chinese Honda 
plant, negotiations and strikes are highly regularized parts of labor relations 
systems in many developed countries. Most established labor relations systems 
try to reverse this sequence—to provide for scheduled periodic negotiations 
that try to reach an agreement without resort to a worker-initiated strike or 
an employer-initiated lockout of the work force. In this way a labor relations 
system can function to make strikes or lockouts last resorts and well-planned 
tactics that complement the negotiations and agreement-seeking process. But 
even when they are built into a labor relations system in this way, worker- or 
union-initiated strikes or employer-initiated lockouts impose significant costs 
on the parties and on an economy. Recent strike experiences in South Africa 
illustrate some of these costs and suggest why most members of society prefer 
to see negotiations resolved without recourse to work stoppages (see box 6.2).
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BOX 6.2
South African Strike Wave, September 2013
Thirty thousand South African automobile workers ended a three-week 
strike in September 2013 and returned to work after accepting a revised 
wage offer from employers, including Volkswagen AG, Ford Motor 
Co. and Toyota Motor Corp. The auto workers, represented by the 
National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA), accepted 
wage increases of 11.5 percent for 2013, 10 percent for 2014, and 10 
percent for 2015. Night shift premium was also part of the settlement. 
NUMSA and the Automobile Manufacturers Employers Association 
also agreed to investigate the possibility of instituting an industry-wide 
medical aid and housing program.
The strike cost the industry as much as 700 million rand ($68.66 mil­
lion) each day. Automotive output accounts for about 7 percent of 
South Africa’s gross domestic product.
South Africa was plagued by strikes in 2013 as unions representing 
workers in sectors from construction to gold mining asked for wage 
increases. After a 48-hour walkout, more than 60,000 of the country’s 
gold miners began returning to work on September 6, 2013, after they 
accepted an 8 percent pay increase. On September 27, 2013, workers at 
South Africa’s gas stations accepted an improved wage offer and ended 
a three-week strike (these workers were represented by NUMSA). The 
gas station workers received an 11.6 percent salary increase in 2013 and 
9 percent increases are scheduled for 2014 and 2015. The employers’ 
initial offer had been a 7.5 percent raise.
In late September 2013, strikes in other sectors of the motor industry 
involving auto parts manufacturers, truck body and trailer builders, and 
car and parts dealers were still ongoing. In January 2014, another round 
of strikes in the platinum and coal mining industries broke out that led 
business groups and the World Bank to pressure the government to 
intervene to avoid further loss in confidence by international investors.
Meanwhile, consumer prices in South Africa rose 6.3 percent in July 
2013, exceeding the central bank’s target (3—6 percent) for the first time 
in fifteen months. Africa’s largest economy is forecast to expand by 2 
percent in 2013, its slowest pace since 2009.
Source: Bloomberg Newsroom, Janice Kew, Kamlesh Bhuckory, and Amo- 
gelang Mbatha, September 8, 2013; “South Africa Faces Challenges in Woo­
ing Investors to Its Strike-Hit Economy,” Wall Street Journal, February 5, 2014.
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Collective negotiations provide labor and management with a predeter­
mined time to set or revise the terms of the agreement governing their rela­
tionship. The pressures of a contract deadline and perhaps of a strike threat 
focus attention and clarify how important each party feels critical issues are 
and whether current practices should be changed or maintained. From time 
to time, negotiations may produce a strike that provides headlines for popular 
press coverage of collective negotiations. But in a well-functioning labor rela­
tions system, a strike is not an act of desperation but rather is connected to 
negotiations and other regular activities that occur over time at the workplace 
and strategic levels of the relationship between labor and management. The 
strategies and tactics used in negotiations are likely to reflect the level of trust 
labor and management representatives have for each other at the outset of 
negotiations, and the results of negotiations will in turn affect the trust that 
carries over to the relationship the parties maintain during the term of any 
agreement. Thus, negotiations offer labor and management a pivotal event 
that can reinforce or change their future relations.
As we will see, some parties to collective negotiations today are attempting 
to bring new approaches to negotiations, often labeled interest-based bargain­
ing or mutual-gains bargaining.1 The new approaches seek to move away from 
more traditional positional bargaining in an effort to increase the potential for 
problem solving in negotiations. Thus, in this process negotiations involve 
making choices about how to bargain and making tactical decisions about 
which approach will best represent the parties’ separate and joint interests.
To examine the various components of the negotiations process, this chap­
ter uses the framework developed by Richard Walton and Robert McKersie.2 
The Walton and McKersie framework is particularly useful in identifying the 
wide variety of pressures and competing interests that bear on the negotiators 
and the negotiations process.
THE FOUR SUBPROCESSES OF NEGOTIATIONS
Although the Walton and McKersie framework was originally developed to 
describe and analyze the traditional positional approach to bargaining that was 
quite common in the United States in the 1950s and 1960s when they devel­
oped their framework, their work also provided the theoretical basis for inter­
est-based techniques that were developed in the 1980s. So we will summarize 
their framework first and then discuss how the dynamics of bargaining vary 
depending on the approach taken.
Walton and McKersie argued that there are four subprocesses o f bargain­
ing in the negotiation of any collective bargaining agreement: distributive
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bargaining, integrative bargaining, intra-organizational bargaining, and attitu- 
dinal structuring. Each subprocess is analyzed below, as are the interrelations 
between the various subprocesses.
Distributive Bargaining
Distributive bargaining involves negotiations in which one side’s gain is 
the other side’s loss. It is win-lose bargaining, also called zero-sum bargaining. 
In distributive issues or processes, what labor gains, management gives up. 
Examples of issues that are most often related to issues of distribution include 
wage rates and fringe benefits. Labor gains more income from a higher wage, 
while management gives up some profit to pay that wage.3 Similarly, workers 
lose when a fringe benefit (e.g., paid vacation time) is reduced, while man­
agement gains higher profits when paid vacation time is reduced.
Since distributive issues involve gains for one side and losses for the other, 
these issues lead to conflicts across the bargaining table. Determining how 
distributive issues are resolved involves the exercise of bargaining power. The 
union, for example, tries to convince management to agree to its request for 
a higher wage by threatening to strike if management does not give in to this 
demand. Meanwhile, management threatens the union with the loss of in­
come associated with such a strike and might also point out that a wage in­
crease would entail additional costs to the work force in the form of reductions 
in employment. In this way, the components of bargaining power, strike le­
verage, and elasticity of demand for labor emerge as the critical determinants 
of how distributive conflicts are resolved.
Distributive issues are at the center of the negotiation of a collective agree­
ment, since disagreement over how to distribute the profits from what labor 
produces lies at the core of labor-management relations. Nevertheless, it 
would be a mistake for students of collective negotiations or participants in 
the bargaining process to lose sight of the fact that there are other dimensions 
to bargaining besides distributive issues.
Integrative Bargaining
Integrative bargaining issues and processes are those in which a solution 
provides gains to both labor and management, leading to joint gain, or win- 
win, bargaining. Labor and management both gain when they resolve prob­
lems that are impeding productivity and organizational performance. If the 
productivity of the firm increases, for example, the employees can benefit in 
the form of higher compensation or shorter work hours, while the firm can 
benefit in the form of greater profits.
The Negotiations Process and Structures 127
Numerous problems that arise in the workplace provide the opportunity 
for integrative gains. Work is rarely performed in the most productive way 
possible: cumbersome practices or outdated work rules often stand in the way 
of peak performance. Labor and management can improve a firm’s perfor­
mance by addressing such practices, by changing job classifications or senior­
ity rules, or by creating procedures that promote high organizational 
performance in other ways.
The introduction of new technology often provides an avenue for integra­
tive gains. The effective use of new technology can increase productivity, 
which can then provide rewards both to employees and the firm. Yet the in­
troduction of new technology onto the shop floor or in the office does not in 
itself lead readily to such productivity increases. Technology works best if it is 
accompanied by changes in work practices—personnel levels might have to 
be reduced, training programs adopted, or supervision adjusted. Integrative 
bargaining would entail the negotiations about how and to what extent these 
productivity-enhancing changes in work rules are made as the new technol­
ogy is introduced.
But why do the parties not automatically make integrative changes, since 
such changes open the possibility of joint gain? In other words, why is inte­
grative bargaining so difficult? The answer to this question is one of the key 
issues in industrial relations.
Why Integrative Bargaining Can Be So Difficult Integrative bargaining is 
an ever-present and sometimes difficult component of the negotiations pro­
cess for a number of reasons. For one thing, although integrative issues con­
tain the possibility of providing joint gains to both sides, it is also true that the 
parties are simultaneously confronted with the question of how to divide up 
any joint gain. In effect, any integrative bargain also prompts distributive bar­
gaining, and the difficulty in resolving the distributive issue can make integra­
tive bargaining difficult.
Consider, for example, what happens when a new technology is intro­
duced into a work site. If it is effectively introduced, the new technology of­
fers the possibility of joint gains in the form of income to both employees and 
the firm. Yet the parties involved cannot escape the fact that if productivity 
goes up when the new technology is implemented, it must then be decided 
how the increased income that technology makes possible will be divided. In 
this way, every integrative bargain prompts a distributive discussion. The 
problem for the bargaining parties is that it can be difficult for them to agree 
on how to resolve the distributive issue (namely, how to share the integrative 
gain). Thus, integrative solutions are sometimes blocked by a disagreement
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between labor and management over how they would divide up the gains 
that result from resolving a problem.
Integrative and Distributive Bargaining Involve Different Tactics Integrative 
bargaining also can become difficult because the parties send confused signals 
and mixed messages to each other. This confusion springs from the fact that 
integrative and distributive bargaining involve very different tactics and nego­
tiating styles. Table 6.1 lists the different tactics used in distributive and inte­
grative bargaining.
Remember, distributive bargaining concerns matters in which one side’s 
gain is the other side’s loss. To do well in such bargaining, the negotiator 
typically finds it valuable to, among other things, overstate demands, with­
hold information, and project a stern and tough image. Effective integrative 
bargaining, on the other hand, involves first identifying and then solving 
problems. The tactics that are typically effective in such problem solving in­
clude an open exchange of information, the airing of multiple voices, and 
information sharing. Distributive and integrative bargaining styles contrast 
sharply with each other.
The problem for labor and management negotiators is that it is difficult to 
be effective at both distributive and integrative bargaining in the same nego­
tiations. One side might set into a distributive bargaining mode just at the
Table 6.1. Distributive versus integrative bargaining tactics
D istr ibu tive  tactics Integrative tactics
Issues Many issues Specific concerns
Positions Overstatement of real position at 
outset as “demands”
Focus on objectives; no final 
positions
Use of information Information is seen as power and is 
held close and used selectively
Information is treated as data and 
is openly shared
Communication C ontrolled: O pen:
process —Single spokesperson 
—Use of private caucuses to air 
internal differences and discuss 
responses
—Multiple voices 
—Use of subcommittees
Interpersonal style H a rd  bargaining:
—Each side is focused on its own
goals and interests
—View is about the short run; not
concerned about long-term
relations
—Low trust
Problem  solving:
—Concern about mutual goals 
—Concerned about long-term 
relations 
—High trust
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moment when the other side is ready for integrative problem solving. And 
when the latter party confronts hard distributive tactics, it might become dis­
couraged about the possibility of integrative bargaining, making it difficult for 
such bargaining ever to occur.
Integrative bargaining also can be difficult because the problems that im­
pede productivity are not always obvious to the two parties, even when they 
agree on how to divide up the possible joint gains. If that does not make ne­
gotiations hard enough, consider that there are two other subprocesses in the 
bargaining process.
Intra-Organizational Bargaining
Intra-organizational bargaining occurs when there are different goals or 
preferences among the members of the union team or the management team. 
For example, intra-organizational bargaining arises when the members of the 
union (or the union negotiating team) have different preferences about what 
the union should strive for during negotiations. Senior union members may 
prefer that the union focus its negotiating strategy on attainment of better 
retirement benefits, whereas younger union members may prefer up-front 
wage increases. Or the craft workers in the union might be in favor of re­
stricting the use of outside contractors for maintaining plant machinery, 
whereas production workers might be concerned with having safer condi­
tions on the line. Box 6.3 describes one of the most intense and highly visible 
examples of intra-organizational conflict in South Africa—the battle over 
which organization represents workers in the mining industry. Tragically, this 
conflict cost forty-four workers their lives. So the stakes in resolving intra- 
organizational differences can be quite significant.
BOX 6.3
Intra-Organizational Issues in the Marikana, South Africa, 
Bloody Strike o f 2012
A strike that occurred in South Africa at the Marikana mine in August 
2012 led to the death of forty-four workers. It was the most violent 
conflict in the post-apartheid era in South Africa and has been com-
. d to the infamous S
The conflict began when two workers were reported to have been 
shot as workers marched on the offices or the National Union of 
Mineworkers (NUM). The NUM, which is closely associated with the
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African National Congress, the ruling political party in South Africa, 
was in dispute with employers over pay at the Marikana mine. Signifi­
cant growth had occurred in the price of platinum, prompting argu­
ments that workers were not sharing in the benefits of the increase. The 
dispute also involved interunion conflicts and pay issues, as the NUM 
was in conflict with a rival union called the Association of Mineworkers 
and Construction Union (AMCU).
Police were called in after the two workers were shot, and additional 
people were shot in conflicts that continued for about a month. Reso­
lution was finally achieved on September 22 with the help of mediators. 
The result was a 22 percent wage increase and a one-time payment 
(2,000 rand) for returning to work. The mediators included the leader 
of the Council of South African Churches and South Africa’s official 
mediation agency, the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation, and 
Arbitration.
It was reported that an unknown number of strikers left the unions 
that had previously represented them after the settlement was an­
nounced. Additional labor conflicts spread to other parts of the mining 
industry after the resolution of the Marikana conflict.
Source: http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/aug/17/marikana 
-action-strike-poor-state-haves.
Members of the management team may also have different preferences or 
opinions about what is feasible in negotiations. This is especially the case 
when multinational firms are involved. Differences can and often do arise 
between corporate executives whose mindset is shaped by practices and tradi­
tions in their home country and local managers who are sensitive to host 
country values, norms, and policies. This became an issue for Walmart in 
China. Walmart’s corporate stance in the United States is to strongly resist any 
unionization efforts. This approach did not work in China (or in Brazil, Ger­
many, the UK, and several other countries with stronger legal and/or political 
norms regarding union representation). It took a lot of internal management 
debate plus pressure from the Chinese government to convince executives at 
Walmart’s headquarters in the United States to allow its Chinese managers to 
accept unions in its stores in China. Debates like these are very common while 
global labor relations processes are being developed and implemented.
Intra-organizational conflict also can occur when one or both of the parties 
bring insufficient decision-making authority to the bargaining table. Nothing 
is more frustrating to negotiators than to realize they are engaging in what is
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called shadow boxing, or surface bargaining—that is, bargaining opposite a 
representative who lacks the authority necessary to make commitments that 
will stick in his or her organization. Inadequate decision-making power or 
authority on the part of a negotiator greatly increases the probability of an 
impasse or a strike as the opponent turns to the strike to force the real decision 
makers to the bargaining table. This source of impasse is especially prevalent 
in public employment in many countries, including state-owned enterprises 
in China, and in other settings where a higher authority must approve major 
budget or funding decisions.
Intra-organizational conflict is common in the public sector because of its 
complex decision-making structures and numerous political constituencies. 
Multiemployer negotiation structures in industries where there is wide varia­
tion in the goals or financial status of the employers is another likely environ­
ment for intra-management conflicts. This has been cited as a particular 
problem in South Africa, where national-level negotiations set specific wages 
for firms of different sizes and circumstances. This has produced calls for more 
flexibility in wage setting to better accommodate differences among firms in 
ability to pay and differences in labor market conditions.
Attitudinal Structuring
Negotiations are deeply influenced by cultural norms and by the interpersonal 
relationships the parties have developed (or not developed) with each other. 
Moreover, trust or distrust can carry over from past experiences, so how the 
parties end one bargaining process often will have a profound influence 
on how the next experience begins. Thus, it is important to consider the 
interpersonal or, in Walton and McKersie’s term, the attitudinal aspects of 
negotiations.
Negotiations also can be extremely emotional. The stakes involved are 
usually high, and the tactics often used in traditional negotiations—threats, 
bluffs, grandstanding for one’s constituents, exaggerated anger—are hardly 
conducive to building rapport among the parties to the process. Add to these 
the fact that any single round of negotiations typically is part of a larger and 
longer-term power struggle between parties who are separated by an inherent 
conflict of interests. One can readily see why hostile attitudes can, and some­
times do, develop in a bargaining relationship and why they can constrain 
effective negotiations.
Consequently, attitudinal structuring (the degree of trust the respective 
sides feel or develop toward each other) is another subprocess in bargaining. 
This subprocess has come to be seen as primarily about trust. If labor and 
management, for example, have a high degree of trust in one another, then it 
should be easier for the parties to engage in integrative bargaining, since trust
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can facilitate the identification of problems (or solutions). In contrast, inter­
personal mistrust can make it difficult to move from initial bargaining posi­
tions to compromise settlements. Mistrust hampers communications between 
the parties and can lead both parties to hold back on concessions they might 
otherwise be willing to make. Obviously, intense hostility can get in the way 
of serious discussion of the substantive merits of the issues.
Labor and management can try to build trust by meeting before or during 
negotiations in forums that facilitate an open exchange of views and concerns. 
Here is where what is happening during the term of an agreement at the 
workplace and strategic levels of the relationship can make a big difference. If 
union leaders and managers are working together on an ongoing basis to share 
information, create employee participation processes, and consult on impor­
tant issues, the trust that develops from these activities may carry over to the 
negotiations process. Alternatively, actions that demonstrate a lack of trust to 
the rank and file, union leaders, or managers during the term of a contract will 
likely carry over into negotiations as well.
Personality traits of negotiators also appear to play a role in trust building. 
Some personality traits, such as excessive authoritarianism, have been found 
to hinder the compromising that is necessary to bring about negotiated settle­
ments. This may pose challenges for both managers and workers in emerging 
countries that historically have placed a high value on deference to hierarchy 
and/or command-and-control managerial styles or cultures. Korea has strug­
gled with this managerial culture and tradition for many years and as a result 
has experienced long periods when workers were unable to openly express 
their grievances. Periodically, these grievances built up to a boiling point and 
exploded in violent protests such as those that occurred in the heart of the 
Korean auto industry in 1961, which were repressed by military force. It 
wasn’t until 1987 that another episode of conflict convinced the Korean gov­
ernment to begin modernizing its labor policies to promote a more orderly 
form of collective negotiations (see the recent example of protests erupting 
over railroad privatization in box 10.2).
MANAGEMENT’S BARGAINING OBJECTIVES
The formation of management’s bargaining objectives (i.e., targets) is a criti­
cal part of the negotiations process. Negotiators often have limits for bargain­
ing, or bottom-line terms of what they will accept short of taking a strike. 
The development of bargaining targets for wages and other key issues is the 
heart of the internal management planning process that takes place before or 
during the early stages of negotiations.
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Since top management is responsible for approving or authorizing targets 
for wages or other bargaining issues, the negotiating team must recommend 
targets that reflect top management’s goals for the organization. Recom­
mending too high a wage target, for example, risks rejection of the recom­
mendations and the loss of influence that results from such a rejection. On the 
other hand, once these targets are established, they play a pivotal role in the 
negotiations process because they indicate the negotiator’s latitude for com­
promise. These discussions can be especially difficult in cultural settings where 
top executives tend to generally keep their specific preferences/views about 
an issue to themselves and their subordinates are expected to infer from more 
general comments what would be acceptable. It can also be complicated in 
settings where the final decision maker is in an office in central headquarters 
in another country. Intra-management coordination in setting objectives is 
even more critical in these settings than in solely domestic settings.
Thus, the labor relations staff has to develop bargaining targets that are re­
alistic and achievable. The criteria that go into this decision-making process 
are discussed below.
MANAGEMENT STRUCTURES FOR 
COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS
This section considers how management structures itself to engage in collec­
tive negotiations. There are three basic characteristics of management’s labor 
negotiations structure: the size of the labor relations staff in relation to the 
number of employees in the organization, the degree of centralization in de­
cision making about labor relations issues, and the degree of specialization in 
decision making about labor relations. The latter concerns the extent to which 
decision-making power is placed in the hands of the labor relations staff in­
stead of in the hands of the operating, or line, managers.
The term labor relations staff refers to staff who are responsible for han­
dling union-organizing attempts, negotiations, contract administration, and 
litigation related to union activity. Other professionals whose work relates to 
human resources tend to handle recruitment, staffing, equal employment op­
portunity, safety and health, and wage and salary administration. Most firms 
now integrate human resource and labor relations activities in a broad human 
resource management unit.
The management staff must first formulate labor relations strategies.4 Once 
basic strategic decisions are made, they must be implemented on a day-to-day 
basis. Management must allocate responsibility for decisions in a way that al­
lows the organization to adapt to new pressures from its environment. In
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short, management must develop a structure that enables the firm to bargain 
effectively and to manage its day-to-day relationship with the union or unions 
that represent workers in the organization.
When a firm’s business strategy changes, this often leads to changes in the 
managers involved in the negotiations process and in their respective roles. A 
key change in recent years is that power has shifted from labor relations staff 
to operations and production managers and human resource specialists as firms 
have shifted to business strategies that include tight cost controls.
Specialization of the Labor Relations Function
There is evidence that power has shifted downward in management structures 
in recent years. Labor relations speciahsts have been losing power to opera­
tions and production managers and, to a somewhat lesser degree, to human 
resource specialists. The main reason for this is that firms now have less need 
for the traditional expertise of the labor relations specialist, which focuses on 
achieving stability, labor peace, and predictability. Instead, many firms want 
expertise in union avoidance, cost control, and flexibility in work rules, and 
achieving these goals requires making changes in workplace practices.
This does not mean, however, that labor relations specialists are no longer 
necessary. Indeed, case studies reveal that lower-level labor relations managers 
secretly delight in the “mistakes” some of the operations and production 
managers and human resource management specialists make as they take 
greater control over critical labor relations decisions. In one large firm, a ca­
reer labor relations manager related to us the story of how the new vice presi­
dent of labor relations who was transferred from another functional area had 
to call in the “old hands” to find out how the contract ratification procedures 
worked.
As a result of their continuing need for technical expertise, most firms con­
tinue to depend on teams of labor relations specialists to conduct negotiations 
and implement policies and agreements. But a number of major firms have 
established strategic planning groups for labor relations, and others have used 
cross-functional teams to develop new bargaining proposals.
The careers of labor relations professionals are changing dramatically and 
thus require new types of education and training. The labor relations profes­
sionals of the future will need the following:
1. Business, analytical, and planning skills
2. Expertise in both traditional labor relations activities and personnel or 
human resource management activities
3. A thorough understanding of operating management issues
The Negotiations Process and Structures 135
4. An ability to work as a member of a multidisciplinary team in 
implementing labor relations strategies and policies
5. Skills in managing innovative labor-management organizational change 
efforts
6. Expertise in Web-based communications and service delivery
THE UNION’S NEGOTIATING TARGETS
Management must also take the union’s preferences into account when set­
ting targets for bargaining. Unless management is powerful enough to totally 
dominate bargaining, the management team will have to consider the poten­
tial acceptability of its wage offer to the union.
Unions will usually establish their own targets for wage bargaining. In set­
ting those limits, union leaders employ two basic criteria for evaluating a 
proposed settlement: (1) the potential effects of the settlement on the real 
wages of the membership (the wage adjustment minus any increase in the cost 
of living); and (2) a comparison of the proposed settlement and settlements 
the firm has made with other bargaining units or with other employees.
Comparisons with other units are important to unions for both economic 
and political reasons. One of the union’s economic goals is to standardize and 
raise wages. This leads unions to favor wage increases that maintain estab­
lished patterns or differentials among employee groups within an organiza­
tion or across similar employers in an industry or region. Union leaders also 
face pressure from their members to preserve “coercive comparisons” with 
the settlements other unions have achieved.5 Rank-and-file union members 
often evaluate their leaders by comparing their own settlement to settle­
ments leaders of other unions have achieved or those that other employers 
have granted. Comparisons are especially relevant when one or more rival 
union might challenge another union for the right to represent a group of 
employees.
Thus, the union tries to persuade the firm to consider higher wages than 
the firm would consider if no union was present. The union’s bargaining 
power will determine the extent to which management takes into account 
the union’s preferences.
Local Labor Market Comparisons
One factor an employer considers when setting wage targets is the prevailing 
wage level in the local labor market. If the employer were to ignore the 
local labor market and allow wages for its employees to become low relative 
to wages at the other employment sites, high employee turnover might
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follow. Low wages also might produce a dissatisfied work force and difficulty 
in recruiting workers with the ability to perform effectively. Setting wages 
too high relative to the local labor market invites an excess of qualified job 
applicants and unnecessary costs.
This does not mean that the employer seeks to pay the lowest wage possi­
ble that will attract workers to a given job. Given a particular local labor mar­
ket, the employer must choose the quality of employees it wishes to hire. The 
employer must decide if increasing the wage level will attract employees of 
sufficiently high quality and lower indirect personnel costs (such as training, 
turnover, and supervision). Labor market comparisons are more likely to be 
used in bargaining relationships where the union is weak. Where unions are 
strong they use their bargaining power to do better than the local labor mar­
ket and gain what they consider to be a fair wage.
Product Market Factors
Product market comparisons play an increasingly important role in manage­
ment decision making. The ability of current or potentially new competitors 
to compete on the basis of lower labor costs has in fact been the dominant 
factor in management’s drive to hold down or reduce wages, particularly for 
those with entry-level and low-skill jobs. The threat of outsourcing this work 
has also been an important part of many employers’ approach to negotiations 
in recent years. In emerging countries, the threat of moving factories to 
lower-wage countries is likewise a constant factor that influences wage 
setting.
The Firm’s Ability to Pay
The effects of wage adjustments on the profits of the firm also influence man­
agement’s wage target. Employers approaching the wage decision examine 
their ability to pay wage increases. Ability-to-pay considerations are likely 
to be especially salient in small firms and in firms facing a weak union.
A union generally is reluctant to give a firm a lower settlement on ability- 
to-pay grounds unless the firm can demonstrate that a serious economic crisis 
would result otherwise. Union leaders and members often must be convinced 
that there would be sizable employment loss before they will agree to a low 
settlement.
Internal Comparisons
Every negotiation is carefully watched by all of a firm’s employees. Manage­
ment must consider how a wage settlement might influence the expecta­
tions and demands of other employees in the firm whether or not they are
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represented by unions. Management, for example, often considers whether 
wage increases provided to unionized hourly workers will lead to pay in­
creases for supervisors and other white-collar employees not covered by the 
union. One reason management provides white-collar employees with pay 
increases in some situations is to try to weaken these employees’ potential at­
traction to unionization.
THE DYNAMICS OF MANAGEMENT’S 
DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
So far we have painted a rather static picture of management’s decision mak­
ing. Yet the actual process of making decisions over the course of a bargaining 
cycle (from the pre-negotiation planning stage to the signing of the final 
agreement) is dynamic. The process is replete with ambiguities over who has 
the authority to set policies, conflicts among decision makers over the appro­
priate weight to be attached to different goals, and power struggles among 
competing decision makers.
The process by which management establishes negotiation strategies in­
volves extensive intra-orgamzational bargaining, which is every bit as intense 
as the bargaining between the union and management. Because the successful 
resolution of internal differences is a prerequisite to a smoothly functioning 
bargaining process, it is important to understand how firms prepare for 
negotiations.
To provide a more complete picture of how management prepares for col­
lective negotiations, a typical case is described in box 6.4.6 This firm was pre­
paring to negotiate a contract with the major bargaining unit in its largest 
manufacturing facility. The contract traditionally sets the pattern for the eco­
nomic settlements with several smaller units at other locations.
Before negotiations (or very early in negotiations) the labor relations staff 
tries to predict as closely as possible what it will take to get a settlement. But 
the staff is ready at all times to revise its estimates based on new or better in­
formation about the union’s position as the negotiations proceed.
The case in box 6.4 illustrates the diversity of interests that exists in the dif­
ferent levels in any modern organization. It shows that the development of a 
management strategy for negotiations is a highly political process, one in 
which the different goals of various groups must ultimately be accommo­
dated. Although the labor relations staff serves as a key participant in the de­
velopment of the strategy, the concerns of operating/business management, 
financial staff, and other interest groups in the corporation are also integral to 
any final decision.
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BOX 6.4
Key Steps in Management’s Typical Preparations 
for Negotiations
In pu t  at the  P lant L evel
The first step in the process of preparing for negotiations takes place at 
the plant level. The plant labor relations staff holds meetings with plant 
supervisors to discuss problems that have been experienced in adminis­
tering the existing contract. From these discussions the staff puts to­
gether a list of suggested contract changes. The staff also conducts a 
systematic review of the grievances that have arisen under the current 
contract and collects information about local labor market conditions 
and wages other firms in the community are paying.
The staff then holds a meeting with the plant manager, who discusses 
the labor relations problems confronted in the plant. The plant’s con­
cerns are classified into two groups: contractual problems and problems 
that should be addressed outside the negotiating process. In addition, 
the labor relations staff asks the plant manager to rank suggested con­
tract changes on the basis of their potential for making a significant 
improvement in plant operations.
In pu t  from  H igher  Levels of th e  F irm
Next, a series of meetings are held at the division level involving the 
division labor relations staff, operations/business management at the di­
vision level, and the corporate labor relations director and staff. From 
time to time, outside industrial relations consultants also sit in on these 
division-level meetings. Here the concerns of the various plants are 
evaluated against two criteria: (1) the operational benefits expected 
from proposed contract changes; and (2) the likelihood that the changes 
desired can be achieved in the negotiations process.
The corporate labor relations staff plays a vital role in these division- 
level discussions, since the expected benefits of different contractual 
changes can be a matter of dispute across the various plants. In addition, 
the division labor relations staff is responsible for carefully examining 
the contract language in the various local agreements for inconsistencies 
or problems that could be removed by clauses that reflect corporate la­
bor relations preferences. Sometimes corporate labor relations represen­
tatives object to changes suggested at the division level because they do
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not correspond to the priorities of the corporation’s officials and because 
those corporate officials do not understand the purpose or value of exist­
ing plant practices.
The corporate labor relations staff works closely with the vice-presi­
dent for finance to develop the wage targets. Information about plant 
labor costs, corporate earnings, and the long-term financial prospects of 
the company and the industry are built into the wage target the corpo­
rate staff ultimately recommends.
In pu t  from  R esearch
A research subgroup in the labor relations staff of the company also con­
ducts background research that is used in management’s preparations for 
negotiations. At least a year and a half before the opening of formal ne­
gotiations, the research staff starts preparing the background information 
necessary for the development of the company’s proposals.
The researchers use a database of information on employee demo­
graphic characteristics and analyze personnel statistics such as turnover, 
absentee, and complaint (or grievance) rates. They also monitor internal 
union developments, such as convention resolutions, union publica­
tions, and union leaders’ statements about the upcoming negotiations. 
In addition, they survey plant managers for their views on their relations 
with the union and on the problems they would like to see addressed in 
the negotiations. The staff also consults plant labor relations staff mem­
bers to obtain their suggestions. This firm probably invests more re­
sources in and assigns more authority for bargaining preparation to its 
research staff than do most other corporations.
The research staff is ultimately responsible for putting together a sum­
mary report that goes to the vice-president of industrial relations and the 
corporate director of compensation. These executives then work with 
the manager of the research and planning department to develop targets 
for bargaining.
T he F inal  Step in  M a n a g em en t ’s P reparation
The final step in management’s preparation for negotiations is a meeting 
involving the corporate labor relations staff, the chief executive officer, 
and the board of directors. At this meeting the corporate labor relations 
director presents for board approval the proposed wage targets and other
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proposed contract changes and the reasons for seeking the proposed 
changes. Sometimes this meeting does not take place until after the Grst 
negotiations session with the union. The labor relations director might 
prefer waiting until then because it may be useful to hear from the 
union before making a recommendation to top management. This 
helps him identify both the relative importance the union is likely to 
place on pay issues and the intensity of the union’s concern about other 
areas of the contract.
The labor relations director described to us how he presents his rec­
ommendation to top management in this way: “I always number my 
proposed target settlements as proposed settlement target number 1. 
Someone once asked me what that meant. I said that this is what I think 
it will take to get a settlement but I number it because I may have to 
come back to you at some point with my proposed settlement number 
2 or even my proposed settlement number 3, et cetera.”
Corporate Restructuring and Governance
Over the past two decades, corporations have increasingly moved toward a 
“core competency” business model. Functions that are deemed central to the 
core business processes of a firm have continued to be done within the firm, 
but other functions have increasingly been outsourced to other firms. This 
trend has affected labor relations in two ways. First, and most important, many 
firms outsourced aspects of their manufacturing, maintenance, or construc­
tion operations, and this often had the effect of reducing the number of 
unionized employees.
The second effect of recent corporate restructuring has been the outsourc­
ing of many of the human resource services that in the past were provided in 
house. Many companies have outsourced training, benefits management, pay­
roll, and other routine employee services. This reduces the career advance­
ment opportunities for human resource professionals, including those who 
serve in the labor relations function. As a result, labor relations professionals 
now spend an increasing amount of their time negotiating and coordinating 
employment practices with specialized (outside) human resource service pro­
viders who work for outside contractors/consultants. This adds further 
complexity to this task, since evidence shows that the enforcement of safety 
and health practices and other basic labor standards often is weaker in con­
tractor firms than in large, more professionally managed firms.7 Increasingly,
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therefore, management and supervision of labor relations occurs across as well 
as within the formal boundaries of a single firm.
The next section reviews the common procedures unions and workers fol­
low during labor negotiations. This material parallels the discussion of the 
procedures management follows in preparing for negotiations.
THE ROLE OF THE UNION 
NEGOTIATING COMMITTEE
The union is represented by a negotiating committee in negotiations with 
management. The makeup of the union negotiating committee varies 
across unions. For large national unions or union confederations with multi­
ple local affiliates, it typically includes union officers, support staff (such as 
members of the local or the national union’s research staff or both), and 
elected worker representatives. Often the leaders of the union’s negotiating 
committee are the highest elected officers of the union that is covered by the 
collective agreement under negotiation.
The negotiating committee will normally meet a number of times before 
the start of negotiations to formulate the union’s list of demands and to begin 
to establish expectations about what the union can win in negotiations. Be­
fore these meetings, the negotiating committee will solicit demands from 
union members, either directly through membership meetings called to dis­
cuss the upcoming negotiations or through surveys.
A union negotiating committee typically also receives information and ad­
vice from the national union’s research staff during its preparations for bar­
gaining. The information provided frequently covers the financial performance 
of the company, forecasts the future performance of the company and the 
economy, and summarizes recent settlements in other unions or the pay im­
provements unorganized workers have received in the same city, firm, or 
industry.
Some unions undertake extensive research and analysis of economic devel­
opments and the financial situation of each company in their industry. Prior 
to entering negotiations, the research staff will conduct extensive briefings 
with the bargaining committee and in some cases will meet with company 
representatives to compare financial data. It is not uncommon for union and 
company research staff to request or share information from each other, if for 
no other reason than to avoid debates over some of the basic facts that both 
need to prepare for their respective teams. Obviously, small unions or unions 
limited to one specific location often lack the resources to do the extensive 
research that is needed on their own. An increasing number of Internet sites
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are now available that provide comparative data on wages paid for particular 
occupations. Similarly, a number of financial services firms provide data on 
the financial performance and market prospects of publicly traded firms. Some 
unions also maintain Web sites with sample contract language on a wide vari­
ety of topics. Unions frequently use all of these external and internal sources 
as they prepare for negotiations.
Many unions now use surveys, focus groups, and/or direct interviews with 
rank-and-file members to gather information about their concerns and priori­
ties for negotiations. This serves as a two-way communication process: it pro­
vides data on rank-and-file priorities and begins to engage the rank and file in 
the negotiations process by informing them of some of the issues that may 
come up.
Acquisition of Strike Authorization if Negotiations 
Reach an Impasse
If a union comes to an impasse with management during the negotiations and 
is considering going on strike over unresolved disputes, two steps commonly 
occur. The union’s constitution may require that the union seek strike au­
thorization from the national (or international) union. Strike approval is an 
important process because, among other things, it enables striking workers to 
receive strike benefits from the union’s strike fund.
A union considering a strike also typically will poll its members. The strike 
vote serves a dual purpose: it tells the union leadership whether the union s 
members support such an action and it helps rally the workers around the 
purpose of the strike.
Contract Ratification
When an agreement is reached between the union s negotiating committee 
and management’s representatives, the union will often then proceed through 
contract ratification procedures. Here there is much variation in the exact 
procedures unions use. Some unions first send a proposed agreement to a 
council made up of lower-level union officers. Some union constitutions re­
quire that the workers covered by a negotiated agreement vote on any pro­
posed settlement.
THE HOLE OF UNION LEADERS IN 
SHAPING STRATEGIES
The actual bargaining demands of unions reflect more than just an averaging 
of their members’ preferences. Several factors combine to produce the com­
plex process by which union leaders arrive at their bargaining objectives.
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First, in addition to considering the preferences of their members, union 
leaders must evaluate objectives in light of the probability that they can be at­
tained. Unrealistic goals must be discarded during pre-negotiation planning 
sessions or early on in negotiations.
Second, individual union members have varying degrees of political influ­
ence in the union. Older or more skilled workers, for example, may be more 
politically influential than other members. Thus, the objectives that are ulti­
mately selected may reflect some workers’ goals more than others.
Third, union leaders must also be concerned about the long-run survival of 
the union and must take steps to preserve those interests. There is always the 
risk that union leaders will emphasize matters relating to union representation 
rights or union dues even though the union members might not put a high 
priority on such items.
Finally, it should be recognized that a central job for union leaders, like all 
leaders, is to lead! Union leaders must weigh strategic options, make deci­
sions, and secure the ongoing support of their members for those decisions.
One of the keys to union leadership is effective internal communication. 
Union leaders need regular upward communication from the rank and file 
and from local union officers. Effective union leadership also requires that 
decision makers communicate their activities and decisions back to the mem­
bers. Unions use techniques such as opinion surveys, Internet (or intranet) 
conferencing technologies, newsletters and in-house magazines, and even 
television or other media advertising to communicate with their members. 
Indeed, the Internet is becoming a key resource in bargaining today. Union 
leaders are learning that if they do not develop skills in using this tool to com­
municate with members, rival groups within the union will do so. The role 
and means of communication in unions and in negotiations in general are 
changing rapidly in the age of the Internet.
THE CYCLE OF TRADITIONAL NEGOTIATIONS
Negotiations often proceed through a cycle in which the four subprocesses of 
bargaining emerge and interrelate.8 A typical cycle for a labor negotiations 
process is described below.
The Early Stages
In the initial stage of a traditional negotiation the parties present their opening 
proposals. This stage often involves a larger number of people than will be 
involved in the negotiations of the final agreement. The union, for example, 
may bring in representatives from various interest groups and levels of the
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union hierarchy. These people participate in developing the initial proposals 
and later become involved in securing ratification of any agreement. The in­
volvement of all these different representatives can resolve any intra-organiza- 
tional disputes within the union.
The union then presents proposals that cover its entire range of concerns. 
Some of the proposals will be of critical importance and will be at the heart of 
the discussions as the strike deadline approaches. Some are important but may 
be traded off at the last minute. Some may be translated into more specific 
demands at a later stage of bargaining or may be issues to which the union will 
assign a high priority in some future round of negotiations. Other issues are 
of low priority and will be dropped as negotiations proceed into the serious 
decision-making stages.
The Presentation of a Laundry List
The union’s presentation of a laundry list of issues serves several purposes. 
Such a list allows union leaders to recognize different interest groups by at 
least mentioning their proposals. Some unrealistic demands will be aired, the 
problems underlying these demands can be explored, and the employer can 
then reject these demands. This process takes the pressure off union officers 
who might otherwise appear to have arbitrarily rejected some group’s pet 
proposal. In addition, either side can also introduce issues in a laundry list that 
it hopes can be pursued in future negotiations.
Initially presenting a long list of proposals and inflated demands might also 
be useful for camouflaging the real priorities of the union. Or a long list of 
proposals can assist integrative bargaining by facilitating problem solving.
Employer Behavior in the Early Phase
Employer behavior at the outset of bargaining varies considerably. Sometimes 
the employer will present a set of proposals to counterbalance the demands of 
the union. At other times the employer will receive the union demands and 
promise a response at a future negotiating session. Many management repre­
sentatives prefer to delay making any specific proposal about wages or other 
economic issues until well into the negotiation process. Because the wage is­
sue can be emotional and divisive, management often tries to resolve non­
wage issues first.
Management may also initially try to camouflage its bottom-line position 
and it, too, may have unresolved internal differences at the start of negotia­
tions. In some firms a decision about what the bottom line is will not be made 
until after the union offers its initial proposals and gives some preliminary in­
dication of its priorities.
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In the early stages the speakers for each side will argue strongly and often 
emotionally for the objectives of their constituents, both to fulfill their obliga­
tions as representatives and to determine how strongly the opponent feels 
about the issues at stake. It should be no surprise that these initial stages are 
the forum for a good deal of grandstanding by both parties (and this grand- 
standing may be a part of intra-organizational bargaining).
The Middle Stages
The middle stages of negotiations involve more serious consideration of vari­
ous proposals. The most important tasks performed in the middle stages of 
bargaining are (1) developing an estimate of the relative priorities the other 
side attaches to the outstanding issues; (2) estimating the likehhood that an 
agreement can be reached without a strike; and (3) signaling to the other 
side which issues might be the subject of compromise at a later stage of the 
process.
Often the parties choose to divide the issues into economic and noneco­
nomic categories. Separating the issues in this way may facilitate problem 
resolution and integrative bargaining. It is at these intermediate stages that any 
obstacles to a settlement may begin to surface.
The Final Stages
The final stages of bargaining begin as the strike deadline approaches. At this 
point the process both heats up and speeds up. Off-the-record discussions of 
the issues may take place between two individuals or small groups of repre­
sentatives from both sides, perhaps in conjunction with a mediator. These 
discussions serve several purposes: because they are private, they enable a ne­
gotiator to save face in front of his or her constituents; they allow each party 
to clarify its position more fully; and they enable the parties to explore possi­
ble compromises.
The bargaining that takes place at the table, in many cases, is only the for­
mal presentation of proposals and counterproposals. At this point the negotia­
tors have a better idea of their opponent’s bottom-line positions and they may 
have had private discussions over what it will take to reach a settlement.
Whether the real bargaining occurs at the table or in the back room is less 
important than the factors that determine whether a settlement will be reached 
without an impasse. In these final stages before a strike deadline, each party 
is seeking to convince the other of the credibility of its threats related to 
the strike issue. Each side also is trying to get the other side to change its bot­
tom line in order to prevent a strike. And each party is trying to accurately 
predict the other side’s real positions on the issues to avoid backing into an
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unnecessary strike. At this stage, therefore, usually only a small number of 
decision makers are involved in the process.
Even if the key bargainers may agree on how a bargaining settlement can 
be reached, agreement is not yet assured. Even at this late point in the process, 
if bargainers aren’t able to sell a settlement to their constituents, the agree­
ment might not be reached and an impasse may occur.
INTEREST-BASED BARGAINING: AN 
ALTERNATIVE TO TRADITIONAL NEGOTIATIONS
The traditional approach to negotiations outlined above has often been criti­
cized for its limited potential for solving problems. The dominance of dis­
tributive issues and tactics, the overstating of demands, and the tactical use and 
withholding of information have all been viewed by critics as ways that tra­
ditional bargaining reinforces rather than overcomes arm’s-length or adver­
sarial tendencies in labor-management relations. As an alternative, a number 
of researchers and a growing number of practitioners have suggested using 
interest-based, or mutual-gains, bargaining techniques.
Interest-based bargaining is essentially an effort to apply integrative bar­
gaining principles from the Walton and McKersie model to the overall nego­
tiations process. This approach to bargaining was first popularized by Roger 
Fisher and William Ury’s best-selling book on negotiations, Getting to Yes. In 
interest-based bargaining, parties are encouraged and trained to (1) focus on 
their underlying interests; (2) generate options for satisfying these interests; (3) 
work together to gather the data and share the information needed to evaluate 
options; (4) evaluate the options against criteria that reflect their interests; and 
(5) choose options that maximize their mutual interests.
Consider how use of these principles alters the typical negotiations process 
described above. Instead of each party beginning the bargaining process with 
a laundry list of inflated demands, each separately produces a list of problems 
that need to be addressed in negotiations to address their core interests. In 
some cases, the parties may even frame the problems jointly by building on 
the reports of labor-management committees that have been set up to collect 
data and study vexing problems such as safety and health hazards, health plan 
costs, or quality. A subcommittee might then be formed to collect additional 
information needed to generate options for the full negotiating teams to con­
sider. Ideally, options can be generated through use of brainstorming (a free- 
flowing discussion in which members of a group are encouraged to generate 
ideas without committing themselves to a fixed position and without criti­
cizing the ideas others suggest). Analysis of the root causes of problems and
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extensive data sharing are also encouraged at this pre-bargaining or early stage 
of the negotiation process. As bargaining proceeds to a decision-making 
phase, standards or criteria are developed to evaluate the options that have 
been generated. The goal is to then choose the options that do the best job of 
serving the interests of both parties.
Box 6.5 describes how one firm prepared for a recent round of interest- 
based bargaining. While much of the background research and information 
gathering is similar, some of this is done jointly with the union. In this case, 
the problem-solving processes that had been put in place in the company- 
union relationship at the workplace provided the foundation for taking a 
problem-solving approach to negotiations as well.
BOX 6.5
How Preparations for Interest-Based Bargaining Occurred in 
One Firm
In this firm, the shift to a new approach to negotiations was a gradual 
and natural outgrowth of the firm’s employee involvement process. 
Some steps in this direction were taken in negotiations ten years ago 
and more in the most recent round of labor negotiations. All of the 
union and management representatives have training in problem­
solving tools and essentially asked each other: “Why can’t we apply 
these tools in negotiations?”
As in the past, the labor relations managers kept a file of issues and 
problems that came up during the term of the agreement and started 
preparations by reviewing this file and interviewing plant managers 
about their concerns. But this time, when this material was brought 
together in a meeting with top division executives, the director of labor 
relations said he didn’t want to take a laundry list of issues into negotia­
tions, only to have some or many of them discarded. Instead, he asked 
his colleagues: “What are your critical problems? What are their root 
causes? What are the costs involved? If we can agree on these things, 
then let’s go into negotiations and fix them.”
Paring the list down and agreeing on what was needed to solve the 
firm’s problems (which were severe at that particular time) involved 
tough internal discussions and negotiations. Eventually, the chief exec­
utive officer had to decide on a couple of key points since these could 
conceivably affect the long-term future of the operations.
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In the end, management decided to bring eight issues to the table and 
the union only brought fifteen or sixteen. In the past the parties each 
would have brought many more issues.
The parties also had smaller bargaining committees than in the past. 
On the management side there was one representative each from legal, 
finance, and manufacturing, along with the labor relations director, 
who chaired the committee.
To promote communication that was more open and more oriented 
to problem solving, the parties decided to use a large round table for 
bargaining. During the actual negotiations, the parties brought in spe­
cialists from time to time with expertise on particular issues such as 
contract language guiding how workers could be transferred to different 
jobs within the firm. Instead of simply exchanging proposals and work­
ing from each other’s lists, the parties scheduled times to discuss issues 
and problems. When they did so, they asked: “Why is that a problem? 
Who is affected? What might we do about it? How would it affect 
things? Can we live with the solutions proposed?”
When it came time to discuss the tough wage issues, bargaining took 
on more traditional features. Union leaders felt that they needed to be 
able to demonstrate to their constituents that they had squeezed man­
agement as hard as they could to get the best deal possible concerning 
wages. Management understood the pressures union leaders were 
facing.
Still, there was better communication because of the integrative 
problem-solving approach.
In theory, an interest-based process does not differentiate between distribu­
tive and integrative issues. Instead, by focusing on basic interests and problems 
that lie in the way of achieving those interests, the parties attempt to use 
problem-solving or integrative strategies to address the full range of concerns 
each party brings to the table. However, experience has shown that some is­
sues are harder to resolve through purely interest-based techniques, since they 
do involve clear trade-offs. When such situations arise in interest-based nego­
tiations, the parties may resort to more traditional tactics and thus combine 
the two approaches to negotiations.
Interest-based bargaining requires a high level of trust among the negotia­
tors and between the negotiators and their principals and constituents. Thus,
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it is difficult to make this process work when attitudes in the larger relation­
ship are hostile or when there are significant intra-organizational conflicts 
among the members of one party or the other.
When should one consider using interest-based techniques and how should 
negotiators go about trying it out? Most experts agree that both negoti­
ating teams need to be trained in these techniques well in advance of the start 
of negotiations. To overcome constituents’ suspicion, some further recom­
mend bringing rank-and-file union members and managers who are not on 
the negotiating team into the training, data gathering, and subcommittee 
processes. Often a specially trained facilitator (as opposed to a traditional me­
diator) is also brought in to coach and assist the parties in interest-based 
negotiations.
While the record of interest-based bargaining to date is still modest and 
some cases of failure have been reported, it is clear that the growing complex­
ity of the problems labor and management face are pressuring them to find 
better ways to produce “win-win,” or mutual gains, solutions.
STRIKES
As noted earlier in this chapter, most labor relations systems expect negotia­
tions to precede any work stoppage. Indeed, a key goal is to reach an agree­
ment without invoking a strike. Whether a strike actually occurs or is merely 
threatened, the strike or threat of a strike plays a key role in motivating the 
parties to move toward an agreement and in determining the outcomes of 
any negotiation. We explore the role of the strike and strike threat in this 
section.
How Strike Threats Influence Negotiated Settlements
In negotiations, the bargaining parties are unlikely to settle on terms that dif­
fer substantially from whatever terms they think would settle a strike if one 
were to occur. Consequently, strikes are an important determinant of the 
bargaining power of both parties.
During negotiations, both labor and management negotiators formulate 
expectations as to what might happen if the negotiations were to reach im­
passe and a strike were to follow. At the same time, both sides have a strong 
incentive to avoid a strike, as each loses income during a strike.
In a strike, workers give up wages. They may try to make up for those lost 
earnings by taking a short-term job. Workers also turn to union strike bene­
fits, the earnings of a spouse, or savings to support themselves and their fami­
lies during a strike.
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Firms lose profits during a strike. They try to decrease the amount of profits 
lost through tactics such as bringing in replacement workers for the strikers, 
converting available inventories to sales, or shifting production to an alterna­
tive site. The firm relies on assets or earnings from other lines of business to 
meet any financial obligations (such as equipment expenses) during a strike. In 
service businesses such as airlines, where business lost during a strike cannot 
be made up through built-up inventory or post-strike deliveries, strikes are 
especially costly. This is one reason why more extensive efforts are made to 
avoid strikes in these settings, as we will see when we discuss dispute resolu­
tion procedures and proposals for reform in the airline industry in the next 
chapter.
The Hicks Model of Strikes
The material below examines more closely the role the strike threat plays in 
the negotiation process and identifies the factors that lead to strikes. John R. 
Hicks developed a very insightful model to analyze the role strike leverage 
plays in shaping negotiated outcomes.9 Figure 6.1 diagrams the Hicks model 
o f strikes. To simplify the discussion, assume the parties are negotiating only 
over wages (or assume that all items in dispute can be reduced to monetary 
terms and represented by a simple wage).
In the Hicks model, bargainers form an expectation of what they would 
eventually agree to if there was a strike. In case A in figure 6.1, both parties 
expect that if there was a strike it would be ended with a wage settlement of 
w(es). If a strike occurs, however, both labor and management will have to 
absorb income losses during the strike. Workers will forgo earnings during
Expected strike wage 
plus cost of strike to 
management
A
w
Expected strike wage
Expected strike wage 
minus cost of strike to 
union
w{esu)
w{esu) -  w{u)
Union's expected strike wage
Union’s expected strike wage 
minus cost of strike to union
, . . , Management s expected strike wage
wifism) +  w(m) . . f . . .  .plus cost of strike to management
w(esm) Management’s expected strike wage
CASE A: A LARGE CONTRACT ZONE CASE B: NO CONTRACT ZONE
Figure 6.1. The Hicks model of strikes
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the strike, and management will lose profits because of the stoppage in 
production.
Cognizant of these potential income losses, the parties should be able to 
find a negotiated wage settlement during the negotiations that they prefer over 
the wage settlement they would end up with at the end of a strike, or w(es).
The income that management would lose during a strike is equivalent to a 
particular increase in the hourly wage cost to management of w(m). Given 
that they expect a strike to end with a wage of w(es), management should 
be willing during negotiations to agree to a wage as high as the expected 
strike outcome plus the cost to management of the potential strike, or w(es) 
+ w(m).
Labor in this case also expects a strike to end with a wage of w(es). The 
income workers would lose during a strike would amount to an hourly wage 
cost to labor of w(u). The workers, during negotiations, therefore, should be 
willing to accept a wage as low as the expected strike outcome minus the 
hourly cost of the strike to labor, or w(es) — w(u).
The difference between what management is willing to accept during ne­
gotiations and what labor is willing to accept during negotiations creates a 
contract zone of potential settlements. Both sides should prefer to reach 
settlements in the contract zone during negotiations over the alternative of 
taking a strike and ending up with the strike wage outcome and income losses 
during the strike.
It is, of course, possible for there be no contract zone. Case B in figure 6.1 
diagrams such a situation. In this case management expects a very low strike 
outcome of w(esm), while the union expects a very high strike outcome of 
w(esu). Even in the face of the expected strike costs, w(m) and u>(u), there is no 
contract zone because w(esu) — w(u) is greater than w(esm) + w(m).
The important point that Hicks noted is that in this framework, there is no 
contract zone only if the parties have very different expectations of the strike 
outcome. The fact is that there is a true strike outcome. If labor and manage­
ment have divergent expectations of the strike outcome, one or both of the 
parties is making miscalculations in their prediction of the strike outcome. 
One or both of the parties must be excessively optimistic about what it thinks 
will settle a strike for there to be no contract zone at all.
Hicks concluded that strikes occur only when there is miscalculation. The 
key point is that since a strike imposes costs on both sides, it should be less 
attractive than a negotiated settlement. Strikes can occur even if there is a 
contract zone, but in the Hicks framework this also requires miscalculation. 
Hicks argued that there may be situations where the parties do not locate 
a settlement within the contract zone even if that zone exists. This occurs
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because—through previous bluffing or intransigence—the parties are unable 
to find the negotiated settlements they both would prefer over the strike 
outcome.
In the Hicks model, negotiators have great latitude to further their side’s 
interests. Given a particular contract zone, it is in management’s interest to 
reach a settlement at the lowest wage in the contract zone and it is in labor’s 
interest to reach the highest wage settlement in the contract zone.
Furthermore, during negotiations it is in each side’s interest to attempt to 
change the other side’s expectation of the strike outcome. Management 
would hke to convince labor that the potential strike outcome is in fact a very 
low wage and labor has an interest in convincing management that the poten­
tial strike outcome is a very high wage. The risk the parties face is that in their 
efforts to change the other side’s expectation of the potential strike outcome, 
they might engage in tactics (such as bluffing or threats) that result in miscal­
culations, a strike, and the associated income losses.
Some of the Sources of Miscalculation
Hicks’s model is a very useful starting point for analyzing the negotia­
tions process. Building on his approach requires an understanding of the fac­
tors that influence the willingness and ability of either side to engage in a 
strike. These factors determine the wage the parties expect they will end up 
with at the end of a strike. Furthermore, the Hicks framework suggests the 
need to uncover the factors that lead either side to be overly optimistic about 
the potential strike outcome or to miscalculate during negotiations in other 
ways.
Behavioral Sources of Strikes Behavioral factors such as the degree to 
which labor is integrated into the surrounding social community may be one 
source of miscalculation that leads to strikes. In a classic study, Clark Kerr and 
Abraham Siegel analyzed strike data across countries and industries. They 
found that strike rates were consistently higher in certain industries, such as 
mining and longshoring.10 The authors proposed that behavioral factors pecu­
liar to certain industries were at least partly responsible for the higher strike 
rates. Workers in longshoring and mining often have their own subculture, 
they are distant from major population centers, and their work involves harsh 
physical labor. Kerr and Siegel argued that workers in these industries are 
comparatively poorly integrated into society and take out their frustrations by 
instigating strikes relatively frequently.
In Hicks’s terminology, Kerr and Siegel identified a set of factors—social 
and geographic isolation—that contribute to the likelihood of miscalculation
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in bargaining. Kerr and Siegel also emphasized that strike occurrence may 
have very little to do with the issues on the bargaining table.
Militancy as a Cause of Strikes Strikes also may occur as a result of 
the militancy of the work force or the union. Over time (and across coun­
tries) strikes tend to occur more frequently during business upturns. This as­
sociation is difficult to explain with the Hicks model, which predicts that 
wage settlements should be higher during business upturns but not strike 
frequency.11
Other theorists instead argue that the higher frequency of strikes during 
favorable economic times (i.e., the pro-cyclical movement in strike fre­
quency) demonstrates that conflict is a product of the bargaining power of 
labor. This bargaining-power model of strikes focuses on the fact that strikes 
are typically initiated by the union and the work force. Thus, during periods 
when the union’s bargaining power is relatively weak, the union is less likely 
to press its demands and less likely to resort to a strike when seeking more 
favorable contract terms.
The bargaining-power thesis also recognizes that strikes are frequently ini­
tiated by workers on the shop floor who are upset by management’s actions 
or by official union policies. (These sorts of strikes often would be counted as 
unauthorized, or wildcat, strikes.) Workers are less likely to engage in this sort 
of shop-floor action when labor markets are slack and workers fear the possi­
bility of layoffs.
It is important to recognize that negotiations involve a large number of is­
sues, that what would actually occur in a strike is highly uncertain, and that 
labor negotiations typically occur repeatedly between the same parties. These 
factors make it extremely difficult to predict the settlement point or the causes 
of an impasse in any given negotiation.
The Role of Strategy in Negotiations and Strikes
To understand the course of negotiations and strikes it is necessary to consider 
the roles the strategies of management and unions play. This provides another 
illustration of a point made throughout this book, namely that activities at 
one level of the labor relations system interrelate with activities at other 
levels.
Management strategies have a major effect on the negotiations process and 
on the strike record. Management behaviors in response to both spontaneous 
protests and scheduled negotiations often are shaped by a combination of ide­
ology and practical strategy. Management’s ideology about unions will influ­
ence its willingness to negotiate and often its preparation to do so. Employers
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who are most strongly opposed to union representation often first attempt to 
ignore or suppress a demand from workers or unions that they negotiate.
Once management goes beyond its ideology, attention turns to how to 
relate its labor relations and negotiation strategies to its business strategies. 
Management’s decisions about investment and products affect its bargaining 
power and negotiation strategies. For example, whether management chooses 
a low-cost, high-volume product strategy or a high-quality, high-innovation 
strategy shapes the extent to which the employer is concerned with lowering 
wage costs. In addition, a company’s overall human resource strategy has an 
effect on negotiations, particularly on employee attitudes.
ALTERNATIVE BARGAINING STRUCTURES
Labor and management do not necessarily make agreements that cover only 
the workers who initially joined or created the union or successfully de­
manded representation rights. For example, the employees in the various 
work sites of one employer represented by a union may wish to join together 
to negotiate a common agreement covering the whole company. In a number 
of emerging countries, company-wide, regional, or industry-wide (sometimes 
call sectoral) labor agreements exist in manufacturing industries such as the 
auto or steel industries. Employee and union preferences are not the only 
determinants of the bargaining structure, however. Before we trace some of 
the determinants of bargaining structure, we need some definitions.
Definitions of Bargaining Structure
The formal bargaining structure is defined as the bargaining unit or the 
negotiation unit—that is, the employees and employers who are legally bound 
by the terms of an agreement. The informal bargaining structure is de­
fined as the employees or employers who are affected by the results of a nego­
tiated settlement through pattern bargaining or some other nonbinding 
process.
Types of Bargaining Units
The two primary characteristics of a bargaining structure are (1) the scope of 
employee or union interests represented in the unit, which can be narrow 
(craft-based), broad (industry-based), or multiskill-based; and (2) the scope of 
employer interests represented in the unit, which can be regional, industry­
wide, or sectoral or some other form of multiemployer unit. All of these 
types are considered variants of centralized bargaining. Bargaining struc­
tures also can be single employer—multiplant or single employer—single plant 
(decentralized).
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Determinants of Bargaining Structures
The major forces that affect the degree of centralization in bargaining struc­
tures are bargaining leverage, public policies, and organizational factors.
Unions can increase their bargaining leverage if they organize a large 
share of the firms that produce a particular product. One of the primary 
mechanisms for raising wages is expanding the bargaining structure so that 
a large share of the firms making a particular product is covered by the 
same collective agreement. But to achieve a highly centralized bargaining 
structure, unions usually must first organize a large proportion of the product 
market and then successfully maintain union coverage over time—a tall 
order.
Unions representing construction workers, for example, have a strong in­
centive to equalize the wage costs among competitive bidders on the same 
product. Thus, in the construction industry, unions prefer bargaining with 
the multiple employers who compete for specific construction projects. For 
example, where builders across a city bid for the contract to build an office 
building, the union representing carpenters in that city will try to bargain in a 
structure that spans the contractors across the city.
E m p l o y e r s  P r e f e r  C e n t r a l i z e d  B a r g a i n i n g  S t r u c t u r e s  i n  S o m e  C a s e s  It 
should not be inferred that unions always gain (and employers always lose) a 
tactical advantage in larger or more centralized bargaining structures. Em­
ployers in companies that provide local services such as hotels, restaurants, 
laundries, and truck haulers have often found it to their advantage to form as­
sociations and to bargain in multiemployer units.
For instance, consolidating the bargaining function allows employers to 
avoid being whipsawed by local union leaders. Union whipsawing occurs 
when a union negotiates a bargain at one plant or company and then puts 
pressure on the next plant or company to equal or surpass the contract terms 
negotiated at the first site. By consolidating the bargaining structure, how­
ever, employers can sometimes reduce the possibility of union whipsawing. 
(Employers can also whipsaw a union when they gain a power advantage.)
C e n t r a l i z e d  B a r g a i n i n g  C a n  S t a b i l i z e  C o m p e t i t i o n  In some cases a cen­
tralized bargaining structure can serve employer interests by stabilizing com­
petition. Employers in small firms in a highly competitive industry may find it 
to their advantage to bargain centrally with a union. This can reduce the 
union’s ability to whipsaw the small firms. If a strike occurs, the centralized 
bargaining structure also ensures that no single employer can gain an advan­
tage because all the firms are shut down simultaneously.
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Centralized bargaining in highly competitive industries can also work to 
the advantage of larger employers that are willing to pay a higher wage but are 
concerned about being undercut by smaller firms or new entrants to the in­
dustry. This was the case in the U.S. apparel industry for many years before 
most clothing manufacturing moved overseas. Interestingly, a similar motiva­
tion has led to the emergence of sectoral bargaining in the woolen, ceramic, 
and plywood industries in several provinces in China. Box 6.6 describes the 
plywood example as it developed in recent years in the city of Pizhou, Jiangsu 
Province.
BOX 6.6
Sectoral Bargaining in China’s Plywood Industry
The plywood industry in Pizhou city, Jiangsu Province, includes about 
2,000 enterprises and 200,000 workers. It accounts for 30 percent of the 
city’s GDP and a third of China’s plywood exports. In 2003, to avoid 
the negative effects of unconstrained competition, the larger enterprises 
set up a sectoral employers’ association for both trade and labor relations 
purposes. Around 300 mid- and large-size enterprises in the plywood 
sector joined.
In 2005, the local union federation and the employers’ association 
conducted a joint survey of wages in thirty large enterprises. Based on 
the results of this survey and on subsequent negotiations, the two sides 
signed an agreement that fixed sectoral minimum wages. This agree­
ment covered sixty enterprises on a trial basis. The two sides moved 
toward a full sectoral wage negotiation in 2006. Since then, there have 
been six annual rounds of negotiations.
There are a number of points of interest in the resulting agreements. 
First, they activated the provisions of China’s 1994 labor law that relate 
to appropriate premium payments for overtime working. This provi­
sion has been widely ignored in China. But the 2006 and 2007 Pizhou 
plywood agreements achieved full compliance with the 1994 law.
Second, at the height of the global financial crisis in 2009, the two 
sides agreed to freeze piece rates and to reaffirm the legal procedures 
governing redundancies. Even though the union association was on the 
defensive in the context of the worsening economic situation, it was 
nonetheless able to gain a concession from the employers’ side in the 
form of the introduction of seniority allowances.
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Third, a skill grade system that was introduced by the 2009 agree­
ment was a high negotiating priority for the provincial union. Together 
with seniority allowance, it may prove to be a first step away from the 
prevailing piece-rate system and toward more secure internal labor 
markets. Finally, there have been rapid increases in negotiated wage 
rates over the six rounds of wage negotiation, ranging up to 33 percent 
in 2008.
Both sides have agreed to augment the members on the workers’ 
side, who were mostly union officials and a few workers’ representa­
tives, with equal numbers of workers’ representatives and third-party 
professionals, such as lawyers and government advisors. In 2008, they 
agreed to have 250 workers’ representatives as observers at the formal 
bargaining sessions, to train workers’ representatives at the enterprise 
level, and to encourage workers’ representatives to begin supplemen­
tary negotiations at the enterprise level following the completion of the 
sectoral agreement.
S o u rc e : Chang-Hee Lee, William Brown, and Xiaoyi Wen, “What Sort of 
Collective Bargaining Is Emerging in China?” B r i t i s h  J o u r n a l  o f  I n d u s t r ia l  R e l a ­
t io n s , forthcoming.
The Chinese plywood case illustrates how centralized bargaining, even at 
the regional level, requires the development of parallel employer and union 
associations. These associations, in turn, need to create internal governance 
and decision-making processes to ensure internal cohesion and acceptance of 
and compliance with negotiated agreements. This often requires significant 
intra-organizational bargaining. One way of avoiding overcentralization is to 
limit the scope of issues that get negotiated at the centralized level, often to 
basic wages and other common terms of employment, while giving individual 
enterprises the flexibility to negotiate on other issues to fit their particular 
circumstances and needs. This might include topics as diverse as child care 
provisions, scheduling arrangements, or work system innovations.
The Bargaining Structure in Brazil
Brazil provides another example of how bargaining structures evolve over 
time, in this case starting with a strong influence of the national govern­
ment in centralized bargaining that has gradually evolved to the municipal 
level. We review this evolution of bargaining in Brazil. Note how bargaining 
in this country is integrated with other provisions of labor and employment
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law. Few other countries have been able to achieve this level of 
coordination.
Collective negotiations in Brazil has its roots in the Consolidated Labor 
Laws passed by President Getülio Vargas in the late 1930s. These laws and 
their system of collective negotiations were loosely based on the political and 
labor laws of Mussolini’s Italy. In this system, which is known as corporat­
ism, the state plays the central role in organizing and channeling labor- 
management conflict. Workers and employers are both organized into 
separate representative bodies: labor unions for workers and employer orga­
nizations for companies. Collective negotiations plays an important role in the 
Brazilian system. Vargas and the designers of the corporatist system sought to 
create institutions that would resolve labor-management conflict but avoid 
more radical and class-oriented organizations such as those in Western 
Europe.
The labor relations system in Brazil is characterized by three key factors: 
exclusive representation by job category and geography, a union tax to fund 
labor organization, and a system of labor courts. Unions are organized by job 
category through exclusive representation by geographical region and are the 
primary site for collective negotiations. Unlike in unions in Western Europe, 
where bargaining is organized by a limited number of “industries” such as 
metalworking, chemicals, transportation, and education, Brazilian unions are 
organized by job category. Job categories are not legally defined and are sub­
ject to legal challenge by rival unions hoping to represent the same groups of 
workers. For example, there cannot be two unions of metalworkers in Sao 
Paulo. However there may be different unions for welders, drillers, auto­
workers, truck workers, steel workers, and so forth, all in the same geographi­
cal jurisdiction. Unlike in countries where unions are organized by a limited 
number of industries—all metalworkers from the same area bargaining to­
gether and providing greater bargaining power for these workers—unions in 
Brazil are highly fragmented, are in fierce competition with each other, and 
often are not in contact with other workers from the same company in differ­
ent regions of the country.
Unions and employers are organized into four legally recognized levels 
based on geography: the municipal sindicato, the state/regional federagao, and 
national-level confederate), and the national, cross-industry central. Brazilian 
law makes no provision for in-plant representation, which means that most 
Brazilian workplaces do not have any type of shop steward, union representa­
tive, or grievance procedure. Some unions have tried to build European-style 
works councils, notably in the auto and chemicals sectors, but employer resis­
tance is often fierce and the bargaining power of unions is limited.
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Collective negotiations are conducted primarily at the municipal level and 
have limited scope and content, mostly related to base wages. The majority of 
statutory regulations, including those related to minimum wages, hours, safety 
and health standards, and vacations, are covered by the federal labor code, and 
collective negotiations at the local level attempt to build from these federal 
regulations. Negotiations are conducted annually and are concerned mostly 
with wages, profit sharing, and employment guarantees.
Multiemployer conventions and firm-level agreements are allowed and are 
designed to improve on the national minimum levels set in federal law, 
but for the majority of unions the scope of bargaining remains narrow and is 
focused on annual wage adjustments. Some unions, mostly the larger indus­
trial unions in the Sao Paulo region, have been able to make broader agree­
ments at the firm and multi-firm levels, but these are by far the exception and 
unions face immense challenges in trying to build coordinated bargaining 
structures.
In many countries, the trend has been toward greater decentralization in 
bargaining structures. South Africa is a case in point. Employers in South Af­
rica have argued for more exceptions to the industry-level bargaining struc­
tures the country’s labor law calls for. As the variations in the size and 
competitive conditions employers face have increased, fewer firms have been 
willing to participate in industry associations and instead seek to negotiate 
separately. Yet examples can also be found where one or both parties seek to 
move toward more centralized bargaining. To enhance their bargaining le­
verage, a number of Korean unions have pursued industry-wide bargaining. 
In the banking industry, the first industry-wide collective agreement was 
signed in 2001.
In summary, there is no single best bargaining structure for all industries or 
countries. But it is not impossible to change bargaining structures that are no 
longer well matched to industry, regional, firm, or union needs.
Pattern Bargaining
Pattern bargaining is an informal means of spreading the terms and conditions 
of employment that have been negotiated in one formal bargaining structure 
to another. It is an informal substitute for centralized bargaining that is aimed 
at taking wages out of competition.
The employees working in the same firm typically are very aware of what 
other employees in the firm are receiving in terms of pay or fringe benefits 
and are very jealous when any differentials emerge. Internal promotion 
(and other features of an internal labor market) within a firm serves to 
heighten such comparisons. Pattern bargaining follows where more than one
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negotiation affects employees of the same firm. This is most common for the 
blue-collar employees of the same firm, but it can also occur where unions 
represent both blue- and white-collar employees.
A number of emerging countries are experiencing pressures to both 
strengthen and weaken pattern bargaining arrangements. The mining strike in 
South Africa described in box 6.5 created strong pressure on other companies 
in the industry to match the wage settlement the strikers received in order to 
avoid similarly violent clashes. In China, the 2010 Honda strike described in 
box 6.1 led other auto companies to increase wages to avoid copycat protests. 
Y et in South African industries other than mining, a growing number of firms 
have resisted accepting the industry wage levels that have historically served as 
the pattern even for firms that did not formally join an industry’s employer 
association.
CULTURAL ISSUES IN NEGOTIATIONS
Cultural differences can also make negotiations difficult when people from 
different parts of the world negotiate with each other, as is often the case to­
day. One study found that agreements took longer and were less likely to be 
reached when Chinese and Americans negotiated with each other than when 
the negotiating pairs came from the same country. Chinese negotiators tended 
to put a higher emphasis on process considerations and preferred to allocate 
more time to building relationships with their counterparts, whereas Ameri­
can negotiators wanted to move more quickly to discussion of the substantive 
issues involved. Paying attention to these cultural differences and their effects 
on negotiating style therefore is critical to the success of cross-cultural 
negotiations.12
Jeanne Brett provides a comprehensive assessment of the role cultural issues 
can play in negotiations.13 Below we provide a summary of the findings in 
Brett’s research on negotiating globally.
To understand the role that culture can play in negotiations it is first im­
portant to define culture. Culture is the distinct character of a social group 
that emerges from the patterned ways people in a group respond to problems 
during social interactions.
To avoid cultural biases when negotiating globally, it is valuable to have a 
“cultural interpreter,” someone who not only knows the language but also 
can interpret the body language and the strategic behavior being exhibited 
across the negotiating table. A cultural expert should also be able to help par­
ties understand the cultural context of the negotiation, for example, the insti­
tutional environment in which the negotiation is embedded.
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It is important to avoid confusing a cultural prototype (a central tendency) 
with a cultural stereotype (the idea that everyone in a culture is the same, that 
there is no distribution around the mean). This is inappropriate, as there is 
always variance within a culture.
It is critical to keep in mind that the values shared by a group differ across 
national cultures. Two key differences in cultures that are particularly im­
portant for negotiations are the degree of individualism versus collectivism 
and the degree of hierarchy versus egalitarianism in each culture. In indi­
vidualist cultures, social, economic, and legal institutions promote the au­
tonomy of individuals, reward individual accomplishment, and protect 
individual rights. In collective cultures, institutions promote the interdepen­
dence of individuals with the others in their families, firms, and communities 
by emphasizing social obligations. In a collectivist culture, individual ac­
complishment reflects back on others with whom the individual is interde­
pendent and legal institutions support collective interests above individual 
interests.
The type of culture negotiators come from may affect their interests, goals, 
and strategic choices. For example, individualistic cultures promote self-inter­
est, which may be reflected in negotiators’ preference for confrontation and/ 
or face saving. In hierarchical cultures, social status determines social power 
and social power generally transfers across situations. In hierarchical cultures 
social inferiors are expected to defer to social superiors, who have an obliga­
tion to look out for the well-being of lower-status parties in return for the 
power and privilege conferred on them by right of their status. No such obli­
gations exist in egalitarian cultures. In egalitarian cultures, social boundaries 
are more permeable and social status may be both short-lived and variable 
across situations.
Western cultures, especially northern European cultures, tend to be egali­
tarian. As you move south from North America to Central and South Amer­
ica, culture tends to be more hierarchical. Asian cultures are usually classified 
as hierarchical.
Norms (i.e., standards of appropriate behavior) about directness or indirect­
ness of communication are also important when negotiating globally. When 
people communicate indirectly, for example, the same words take on differ­
ent meanings in different contexts. Cultures that favor indirect communica­
tion tend to be collectivist in nature. People in direct-communication 
cultures, in contrast, understand each other because they share a vocabulary. 
Direct-communication cultures also tend to be individualistic.
Research does not support the idea that negotiators from some cultures 
primarily use integrative strategies and those in other cultures primarily use
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distributive strategies. Research also shows that there is a substantial variation 
within cultures in the ability to use integrative strategies.
Sum m ary
The structures and processes of negotiations vary considerably across coun­
tries, reflecting differences in the stage of development of labor law, the ide­
ologies and strategies of employers and labor organizations, shifting bargaining 
power, and national cultures and institutions. While most well-developed la­
bor relations systems seek to regularize negotiations processes as means of 
limiting strike activity, breakdowns in negotiations still generate strikes from 
time to time. When well-developed labor relations laws and established struc­
tures for negotiations do not exist, it often takes protests, strikes, or other 
confrontations to initiate negotiations.
Once it is clear that a negotiation process is called for, the parties need to 
develop skills and abilities to adapt negotiation practices as conditions change 
over time. These skills and abilities include
• Separating distributive (conflicting) issues from integrative issues (those 
where the parties share common goals) and using modern negotiation 
tools so the parties can avoid miscalculating each other’s bottom lines 
regarding distributive issues and missing opportunities to pursue shared 
interests regarding integrative issues;
• Building positive, constructive relationships with counterpart 
negotiators so the parties can trust each other’s statements as 
negotiations proceed toward either an agreement or an impasse;
• Adapting the structure of bargaining as competitive conditions and or 
the mix of employers or unions change over time;
• Exploring new ways to negotiate, such as using interest-based 
bargaining processes or other ways of improving problem solving in 
negotiations;
• Building ongoing processes for implementing and administering 
agreements reached in negotiations and for resolving disputes during the 
term of the agreement; and
• Recognizing and appropriately adapting to any cultural issues that might 
be prevalent in a negotiation.
In summary, negotiation processes serve as the central activity at the middle 
tier of the three-tiered labor relations framework introduced in chapter 1. 
They need to be supported and complemented by effective mediation and
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arbitration or other dispute resolution processes, topics we turn to in the next 
chapter.
Discussion Questions
1. Describe the four subprocesses of negotiations developed by Walton 
and McKersie.
2. What are the key aspects of the three stages in a typical negotiation 
cycle?
3. Describe the Hicks model of strikes.
4. Give some examples of how management strategy has influenced the 
course of negotiations or strikes in recent years.
5. How do traditional and interest-based negotiation processes differ?
6. Define bargaining structures and discuss some of their determining 
factors.
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